Commander of GROM, who created the most elite commandos in Europe – Gen. Roman Polko

Polko describes how the previous commander, chosen for his English skills, couldn't control the men. The soldiers were undisciplined, and morale was low. Polko, despite not speaking English at the time, was made company commander after two months. He found that soldiers actually crave good leadership. He established a clear system of punishments and rewards, and treated them with respect. Within a short time, only about 10% of the conscripts left; the rest, including one with a criminal record for refusing military service, became professional soldiers. He witnessed a corporal publicly scolding a lieutenant, saying that without Captain Polko they'd still be in the mess. This showed him that soldiers have a strong sense of self-preservation and will reject incompetent leaders. The key is to provide structure and show that you care about their welfare, not exploit them.

Polko explains that when he took over GROM, the unit lacked staff officers and logisticians because everyone had to pass the same grueling selection. He brought in General Tłok-Kosowski, who had combat experience and procurement skills but hadn't done selection. He argues that for support roles, selection is irrelevant; what matters is competence. He also criticizes the Polish physical fitness system, which penalizes specialization: a weightlifter might fail agility tests and get a lower score, even if his strength is exceptional. He designed an American-style system where exceeding standards in one area gives extra points, but it wasn't adopted. He later changed GROM's selection to be role-specific. He also notes that the current commander allows candidates to choose their own gear for the test, reflecting the shift toward cognitive skills.

Polko recounts that when he took command, there were documents already drafted to reduce GROM to a few dozen soldiers or transfer it to the military police. The chief of general staff, General Piątas, wanted to 'plow under' GROM. Polko, with support from his team, fought back. He used his contacts with Americans, including Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, to argue that the US wanted to cooperate with GROM on counter-terrorism and preventing smuggling of fissile materials. He then posed the question to the minister: if you disband GROM, will you give those competencies to the Americans? This put the minister in a bind. He also threatened resignation. The minister eventually sided with him, saying 'Maybe they should be like independent princes.' This political battle was crucial to saving the unit.

Polko explains that in Iraq and Afghanistan, even after meticulous planning, situations changed dynamically. He gave his field commanders broad initiative. He quotes Admiral McRaven's book: we were losing to terrorists because they didn't have to ask higher headquarters for permission. When you captured a terrorist and found documents about an imminent attack, you had to get approval to act, which put you a step behind. Polko told his men, 'Better to ask forgiveness than permission.' He himself, when participating in a mission to capture an air force commander, was subordinate to a GROM captain who planned the operation. He says a general doesn't command on an aircraft; the captain does. Similarly, in the field, the operator in charge calls the shots.

Polko describes a situation where a soldier said, 'If you promote me from captain to major, I'll stay.' He refused to be blackmailed. He also tells of soldiers who criticized his command; he told one, 'Sławek, I don't deserve to command such a wonderful person as you. Either stay and do your job, or let's meet in the tradition room, I'll thank you nicely and give you a reward.' He says no one is forced to work. This approach, he believes, was key to consolidating the unit after the initial exodus when he took over. Many left because of pay cuts and uncertainty, but those who stayed were committed and formed a 'band of brothers.' He also applied this to the mutiny in his earlier company: after they bonded through the mutiny, he channeled their energy into excellent performance.

Polko recounts that when he took command, the unit was demoralized and had internal problems, including a drunken incident where two soldiers shot a colleague. He believed they needed a challenge. He lobbied ministers to send GROM to Kosovo, to show they could cooperate and weren't just 'independent princes.' Later, the Iraq mission solidified their elite status. He says that without challenges, they fought each other; with a common enemy, they united. This principle also applied to his earlier company: after the mutiny, he gave them a tough inspection, and they excelled. He also notes that after the Iraq mission, he conducted after-action reviews where every soldier pointed out mistakes—that was healthy, a sign of a learning organization.

Polko acknowledges that the commander's place is at the command post, but argues that there are times when you must be with the soldiers. He gives the example of Kosovo, where a company commander couldn't break a Serb roadblock; Polko had to go personally, negotiate, and ultimately order a forceful breach. He also participated in a GROM mission to capture a terrorist, where he was subordinate to a captain. He says that after the Iraq invasion, he went to the front lines despite the minister's prohibition, because he felt he needed to be there. He also mentions the tradition in GROM of exercises with live ammunition where the commander stands near targets—he participated to maintain continuity, though he wasn't impressed because he had faced real bullets in Yugoslavia. He emphasizes that if a commander has a complex about his subordinates, he shouldn't be a commander. Being present is not about proving bravery but about shared risk and credibility.

Polko explains that he wrote a proposal for an American-style fitness assessment, but it wasn't adopted. He observed that soldiers who focused heavily on gym strength often had problems with agility and speed, and their overall score suffered. In the American system, if you exceed standards in one area, you get extra points that can compensate for lower scores elsewhere, giving a more holistic picture. He also notes that for GROM, he changed selection to be role-specific, so a logistician didn't need the same physical prowess as an assaulter. This aligns with his broader philosophy of valuing diverse skills.

Polko explains that when he took command, the unit had no staff, no logistics, and a budget of 17 million. He needed specialists like General Tłok-Kosowski, who had combat experience and procurement skills but hadn't undergone selection. He argues that for support roles, selection is irrelevant; what matters is competence. He also reveals that his predecessor invited a highly respected soldier to selection only to fail him deliberately, to show that even the best can fail. This, he says, proves selection can be a tool for manipulation. As commander, he was the one who signed off on selection results, so for him to undergo selection would mean evaluating himself—an absurdity. He emphasizes that the real test is the year-long training after selection, where true suitability emerges. He also changed selection criteria to be role-specific, not a one-size-fits-all physical test.

Polko recalls that when he arrived at his first unit, the biggest problem was alcoholism, especially among senior officers. He describes training exercises where soldiers would toil in the forest while the cadre drank, and when inspections came, they'd demand soldiers gather mushrooms or catch eels for them. He also tells of receiving a shoddy, cheap watch as a prize for winning a competition, while the organizers kept the expensive real prizes for themselves. He calls it theft and pathology, noting that this same corruption now plagues the Russian army. He contrasts this with the ethos he built in GROM, where such behavior was unthinkable. He also links this to the broader problem of treating soldiers as cannon fodder, as Putin does, rather than as valued professionals.

Polko explains that when he took over the company in Yugoslavia, the soldiers were undisciplined because the previous commander couldn't lead. Once he established order and showed he cared, the soldiers transformed, even a conscript with a criminal record became a professional soldier. He witnessed a corporal dressing down a lieutenant, saying that without Captain Polko they'd still be in the mess. This taught him that in crisis, soldiers have a strong survival instinct and won't tolerate poor leadership. He carried this into GROM, where he encouraged debate and even mutiny. He tells of a time when his company planned a collective refusal to shoot because he had pushed them too hard; one soldier accidentally hit a target and was scolded by the others. That mutiny actually bonded the company, and later they performed excellently on an inspection. He says, 'I would prefer such soldiers who shout, rebel, say: That was crap, that was bad. But I know that they care.' He contrasts this with officers who just nod and say 'great idea' to survive. He also quotes the film Swimming with Sharks: if you haven't rebelled against the system by 20, you have no heart; if you haven't built a system by 30, you have no brain. He applies this to GROM: they have heart, and they need to build systems.

Polko recounts that when he took command, morale was low due to uncertainty about the unit's future. A female soldier, Nikita, approached him and said she didn't care about pay or other issues; she just wanted to do her job and test herself in combat. He was impressed by her high morale and sent her on a combat mission. This drew complaints from some of his own commanders, who said the Americans didn't like it because they didn't send women into combat. Polko pushed back, arguing that if women meet the physical and mental standards, they should be allowed to serve. He later discovered from interviews that even after he thought barriers were broken, the women still faced constant pressure to prove they weren't worse than men. He extends this to society, noting how female presidential candidates are judged differently. He also discusses with the current GROM commander about selection, where candidates can choose their own gear; some overload on heavy equipment, others take only smart devices, reflecting the shift toward digital skills. He uses the example of the Navy SEAL who killed Bin Laden, who said they could teach Rangers tactics but wouldn't play football with them because they'd get killed, illustrating that elite operators aren't necessarily the biggest or strongest.

Polko describes the absurdity of watching people who once lived together suddenly spiral into hatred, killing each other, burning homes, raping, all driven by politicians. He says it's both funny and terrifying, and the longer you look, the harder it is to understand. He questions whether the wars were necessary. He points to the decision to disband the Iraqi army, against General Sanchez's advice, which created ISIS. He notes that the US Vice President now says the Iraq war was a mistake, and asks why Europe didn't react—yet Poland supported the US strongly, showing honor and capability. Now that support is questioned. He recalls the French president's quip: 'You missed an opportunity to stay silent.' He also laments that after the Iraq mission, his soldiers received no medals or recognition from the Polish government; they were used for a photo op by Prime Minister Miller. He says politicians lied, and soldiers feel cheated. He contrasts this with the honor code of GROM soldiers, who never looted or stole, even when capturing terrorists with large sums of money.

Polko explains that after he left command, the new leadership under Dariusz Z. (later convicted for corruption) fired experienced soldiers like Colonel Pawluk, who had just returned from Afghanistan with a high military order. Polko spoke out in the media, saying something was wrong. In response, Dariusz Z. and former commander Petelicki orchestrated a campaign to strip his badge. They accused him of various things, including that he didn't write his book 'Gromowładny' (he says he spent nights authorizing every word to ensure no classified info). He was never shown the accusations or given a chance to defend himself. He calls it a 'kangaroo court' that Putin would be proud of. He later learned that the real reason was his support for the purged soldiers. He sued Petelicki for defamation, but Petelicki's suicide ended the case. When Dariusz Z. was later caught in a corruption scandal, Polko refused to push for his badge to be revoked, saying he had earned it as an operator and it wasn't his fault a politician dragged him into the mud. He even received a thank-you call from Dariusz Z. for remembering his good service.

Polko explains that when he designed a physical fitness assessment based on the American model, it wasn't adopted; the Polish system still penalized specialization. He says that if you only valued super fitness, you'd recruit sports champions, but that creates problems with agility and endurance. He later changed GROM's selection to be role-specific: different criteria for staff officers, logisticians, and assaulters. He recounts a conversation with the current GROM commander, who told him that during selection, candidates can choose their own gear; some overload on heavy equipment, others take only smart devices. This reflects the shift toward digitalization and using local assets and cunning. He cites the book by the Navy SEAL who killed Bin Laden: after the operation, Rangers invited them to play football, and the SEAL said they could teach tactics but wouldn't play football because the Rangers would kill them—showing that elite operators aren't necessarily huge. He concludes that in special forces, what counts is cleverness, agility, courage, and many other traits beyond physique.