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#125 - John Arnold: The most prolific philanthropist you may not have heard of
~537 min
Episode Brief·YouTube

#125 - John Arnold: The most prolific philanthropist you may not have heard of

Peter Attia
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TL;DR

The four things you'd lose by not watching

4 items

TL;DR

The four things you'd lose by not watching

4 items
1

John Arnold, the most successful natural gas trader in history, retired at 37 to deploy his entire fortune in philanthropy during his lifetime — spending $400M per year through Arnold Ventures on criminal justice, k-12 education, pharmaceutical pricing, and public finance reform.

2

The same two mental traits that made Arnold a legendary trader — emotional detachment from outcomes and calibrated confidence (arrogant enough to take a position, humble enough to be wrong) — directly underpin how he selects and prosecutes philanthropic bets.

3

Arnold Ventures targets 'orphaned areas': problems with obvious structural flaws, emerging bipartisan consensus, and very few competing philanthropic actors — maximising additionality rather than adding dollars to already-funded causes.

4

Effective philanthropy means changing the incentive structure of a system, not funding more programs within a broken one — the evidence quality crisis in social science means almost every 'proven program' falls apart under rigorous evaluation.

Protocols

Concrete recipes — what, when, how much, and why

6 items

Three-criteria issue selection for high-leverage philanthropy

WhatBefore committing resources to a new policy area, evaluate against three criteria: (1) the problem has obvious structural flaws with conceivable solutions, (2) a viable political window is likely to open in the future even if it is currently closed, and (3) you have genuine additionality — few other well-resourced actors are working the problem.
WhenBefore entering any new philanthropic area, policy domain, or funding commitment. Spend one full year with a dedicated internal expert team doing the canvass before writing any grants.
DoseArnold Ventures spent approximately one year in canvass mode for each new domain (criminal justice, health policy, k-12). The year involves reading the academic literature, mapping the actors, identifying the structural market failures, and locating where a foundation can add leverage.
For whomAny large foundation, major donor, or organisation trying to move from charitable giving to systems-change philanthropy.
WhyProblems that already have many well-funded philanthropic actors offer low additionality — your marginal dollar moves nothing. Orphaned areas where you can be the dominant funder multiply your leverage. The political window criterion prevents wasted effort: good solutions must be paired with moments when policymakers can act.
CaveatsThe political window criterion requires willingness to do years of preparation work with no visible output — the investment precedes the opportunity. This approach is incompatible with short-term impact reporting pressure.

Arnold applied this framework to pharmaceutical pricing: 'we started working in this area about eight years ago and after doing that same type of canvassing we realized that our first area should be on drug prices and i identified that as an area where i had very obvious flaws in the existing system that there were ideas that were one could conceive of being enacted on how to fix it and that the political window might open in the future.' He used the same framework for criminal justice reform: enter when left and right are starting to converge, but before the window fully opens. The approach has been successful: Arnold Ventures helped pass pharmaceutical pricing legislation through Senate Finance Committee before it stalled at the floor.

Mechanism

By pre-positioning — developing evidence, building relationships, and publishing solutions — before the political window opens, the foundation can present ready-made ideas to legislators who suddenly have both mandate and deadline.

we spent a year just thinking about all the ways inefficiencies in the system that lead to bad outcomes that don't promote public safety that destroy neighborhoods that aren't fair and equitable for those that are charged or convicted of a crime

Also said
“we typically get drawn to the areas where i'd call them orphaned areas where there's not much focus especially philanthropic focus things like public pension reform or changing how elections are conducted or the pharmaceutical pricing or surprise billing things where the day we enter it we probably have committed the most money of any other philanthropic actor in the system”— The orphaned areas heuristic: maximum additionality equals minimum competing philanthropic capital.

Expected value framework for decisions under uncertainty

WhatMap out the full probability distribution of outcomes for any high-stakes decision — not just the central case. For each scenario, estimate fair value (impact, cost, probability of success). Weight them by probability. Commit to the position only when the expected value at current cost is clearly favourable. Size the commitment proportionally to confidence.
WhenAny major philanthropic bet, policy investment, or strategic decision with uncertain outcomes. Also applicable to individual career decisions and personal financial decisions.
DoseThis is a permanent cognitive discipline, not a one-time exercise. Arnold describes it as the process he ran in real time during natural gas trading and now runs in slower motion for multi-year philanthropic commitments.
For whomAnyone making large-commitment decisions under uncertainty — investors, policy architects, researchers allocating limited experimental budgets.
WhyMost decision-makers focus on the central-case scenario and ignore the distribution. The Amaranth failure was not a weather bet that went wrong — it was a failure to price the full distribution: even had the supply shock happened, the upside was already priced in. The same logic applies to policy: a program that looks transformative in its proponents best-case scenario may have near-zero expected value once you weight by execution uncertainty.
CaveatsThe framework requires honest probability estimates, which are psychologically hard when you are emotionally committed to an outcome. Arnold credits emotional detachment as the prerequisite skill: 'i had this emotional detachment from the business so if i was having one of my best days or having one of my worst days if you walked by me you could not tell it was just 100 focus on executing the process.'

Arnold's description of the Amaranth trade is the clearest exposition: 'you have this probability distribution function of the possible outcomes and then think about okay under each outcome how would i think about what fair value is of the commodity at that time and then did your simple math and you come to expected value.' He explicitly applies this to philanthropy: 'we are taking the best available information and saying how much risk should society be willing to take to test a different idea.'

Mechanism

Expected value weighting forces you to price the bad tail, not just the good one — the most common error in both financial speculation and philanthropic grant-making.

you have this probability distribution function of the possible outcomes and then think about okay under each outcome how would i think about what fair value is of the commodity at that time and then did your simple math and you come to expected value

Also said
“the notion of going in saying i think we're right about this but it might not work or we might be wrong it's going to write down our theory and test it along the way and see if it's playing out the way it should and not get wedded to this theory”— The philanthropic application: treat the foundation's theory of change as a testable hypothesis, not a commitment.

Calibrated-confidence sizing: arrogant enough to act, humble enough to be wrong

WhatBefore any major commitment, explicitly calibrate your confidence on a spectrum between paralysing self-doubt and fatal overconfidence. The target: believe your analysis is correct and act on it, AND size your exposure such that if you are wrong you are not destroyed. Requires explicitly designing the position for the worst plausible alternative scenario, not just the expected scenario.
WhenAny irreversible or large-commitment decision — specifically at the sizing stage, not the thesis stage.
DoseArnold describes this as a two-step discipline: first form the thesis (am I right about this?), then size the bet (how much can I lose if I am wrong?). Most intelligent people spend all their energy on thesis quality and none on position sizing.
For whomTraders, investors, philanthropists, entrepreneurs, researchers making large-commitment decisions.
WhyThe failure mode of confident people is not usually a bad thesis — it is right thesis, wrong size. Brian Hunter's thesis on natural gas directional direction may have been correct; he was destroyed by position size relative to the bad-scenario outcomes.
CaveatsThe required skill is emotional detachment — the ability to hold a strong view while simultaneously modelling the scenario where you are wrong without being paralysed.

Arnold identified his two trading superpowers: emotional detachment and calibrated confidence. 'You have to be arrogant but you can be too arrogant and that has been the destroyer of many trading careers is if you stick with it I am right the market is wrong then you are going to blow up and so it is how do you have the right level where it is like i am confident in my view on this but i know might be wrong.' He explicitly states both traits serve equally well in philanthropy as in trading — the ability to fund a difficult systemic intervention without needing vindication on a quarterly basis requires the same emotional architecture as holding a long-duration commodity trade.

Mechanism

Confidence drives action (overcoming status-quo bias); calibrated position-sizing enforces survivability in the wrong-scenario — producing the combination of decisive action and sustainable risk management.

Personal experience

Arnold describes being emotionally flat whether his fund was up or down on any given day: 'if i was having one of my best days or having one of my worst days if you walked by me you could not tell it was just 100 focus on executing the process.' He credits this as innate rather than learned, which is unusual candour about the limits of teachability.

you have to be arrogant but you can be too arrogant and that's been the destroyer of many trading careers is if you stick with it i am right the market is wrong then you're gonna blow up and so it's how do you have the right level where it's like i'm confident in my view on this but i know might be wrong

Domain focus as competitive moat: master one area, resist all adjacent expansion

WhatDeliberately narrow the scope of your expertise to the smallest domain where you can achieve genuine best-in-class status. Actively refuse to expand into adjacent areas even when those opportunities are available. Return capital or time when the opportunity set in your domain structurally shrinks rather than chasing yield in unfamiliar territory.
WhenAt the initial strategy stage of any venture, and re-evaluated each time an expansion opportunity presents. Also at the point where returns in your current domain begin declining — the answer is often not expansion but exit.
DoseArnold capped Centaurus at approximately $6B AUM and refused to trade oil, natural gas equities, agriculture, or anything outside North American natural gas and power. When shale fundamentally changed the market structure post-2008, he wound down rather than diversified.
For whomAnyone building a career, business, or philanthropic program where the temptation is to grow through diversification.
WhyBroad coverage and deep expertise are inversely correlated in competitive markets. The edge that generates above-market returns is almost always information asymmetry within a narrow domain. Expanding the domain dilutes that asymmetry.
CaveatsDomain focus requires honest assessment of when your domain's opportunity set has structurally changed. Arnold wound down Centaurus when shale eliminated the gas-market inefficiencies his entire edge depended on.

Arnold: 'i made a very deliberate decision that i was going to keep the focus of the business narrow which i wanted to be the best in the world at north american natural gas and power trading that was the business did not want to trade oil did not want to trade natural gas stocks or natural gas bonds did not want to trade agriculture stick to our expertise do not try to build an empire here just do this one thing.' He also explains the exit discipline: as shale progressively flattened gas-market volatility, the opportunity set was gone and the correct response was return capital to investors and redeploy attention to philanthropy.

Mechanism

Information advantage is the primary driver of excess returns in competitive markets. Deep domain knowledge creates an information moat; breadth destroys it.

i made a very deliberate decision that i was going to keep the focus of the business narrow which i wanted to be the best in the world at north american natural gas and power trading that was the business didn't want to trade oil didn't want to trade natural gas stocks didn't want to trade agriculture stick to our expertise don't try to build an empire

Biological-evolution diagnostic for system self-improvement capacity

WhatEvaluate any existing system against three evolutionary criteria: (1) genuine variation — different actors trying genuinely different approaches; (2) differential fitness — approaches that work grow and approaches that fail shrink; (3) heritability — successful innovations spread to the rest of the system. If all three are absent, the system cannot self-improve and requires structural redesign, not more resource input.
WhenBefore committing philanthropic or policy resources to improving an existing institution. If the system fails all three criteria, funding programs within it produces incremental improvement at best.
DoseThis is a diagnostic framework, not a time-boxed activity. It takes weeks to months of research to correctly assess whether a system has the three evolutionary properties.
For whomPhilanthropists, policy makers, and researchers deciding whether to reform an existing institution or replace it with a new structural model.
WhyGovernment monopolies systematically fail all three criteria. A public school district has minimal real variation, no differential fitness (bad schools are not closed), and poor heritability (innovations die with the principal who invented them). Without these properties, pouring money into programs is subsidising a system that cannot learn.

Arnold: 'strong and robust systems of any kind have the attributes of biological evolution right and so in living organisms that is the phenotypic variation you have variants amongst the organisms differential fitness is there a different rate of survival and reproduction and then the heritability of fitness.' He applies this to explain why New Orleans post-Katrina was a natural experiment: forced conversion from a monopoly school district to a diverse ecosystem of charter operators created the variation and fitness pressure the prior system lacked.

Mechanism

Systems that lack Darwinian selection pressure are not failed versions of systems that have it — they are categorically different structures. No amount of additional program funding compensates for the absence of a selection mechanism.

strong and robust systems of any kind have the attributes of biological evolution right in living organisms that's the phenotypic variation you have variants amongst the organisms differential fitness is there a different rate of survival and reproduction and then the heritability of fitness

Upwind giving: invest at the preventive front-end, not the corrective back-end

WhatWhen choosing where to intervene in a system that produces bad outcomes, invest at the point in the pipeline that prevents people from entering the system rather than at the point that rehabilitates them once they are inside. The return on prevention dwarfs the return on correction, but correction investment is politically easier because outcomes are visible and attributable.
WhenWhenever allocating resources between preventive interventions (education, early childhood, policing reform, community investment) and rehabilitative interventions (prison programming, re-entry services, addiction treatment after onset).
DoseThis is a portfolio allocation principle. Arnold describes the Innocence Project example: decades and tens of thousands of hours to remove one wrongfully convicted person from death row. The same resources applied to upstream policy reform could prevent thousands of wrongful convictions.
For whomAnyone funding social-impact work in criminal justice, education, health, or poverty.
WhyThe back-end of any system that produces harm is always harder and more expensive to address than the front-end. Post-conviction re-entry programs have poor evidence of effectiveness despite enormous effort; the criminal justice system has been trying them for decades.
CaveatsUpstream prevention is harder to evaluate because the counterfactual (the crime that did not happen, the school dropout that did not occur) is invisible. This creates a political-economy problem: legislators and donors want attributable outcomes, which systematically disadvantages prevention funding.

Arnold applies this principle across all his philanthropic domains: in criminal justice, the foundation focuses on policing reform and plea-bargain reform (upstream of incarceration) rather than prison programming (downstream). In k-12, the focus is on school-system structural reform rather than individual-school tutoring programs. The logic is consistent: prevention ROI is nearly always higher than correction ROI, but correction spending dominates because its beneficiaries are visible and sympathetic.

you could have a hundred innocence projects you will still never fully be able to rectify the situation notwithstanding the fact that you can't undo retroactively all the harm that is done by the time person is set free

Also said
“if you wait until the day someone's released that's way too late it's like if you wait until someone drops out of school to step in with some more social services it's too late”— The universal principle: the leverage is always at the front of the pipeline, not the back.

What's new

Personal practice updates, fresh positions, predictions

5 items

Strategic philanthropy vs charity: the 1% economy that changes systems

~1 h 15 min

The entire philanthropic sector for social goods is roughly 1% of US GDP after stripping out arts, religious giving, and hospital construction. Arnold's framework: charity supplements today's government services; strategic philanthropy tries to change the systems that generate those needs. Both matter, but only large foundations can pursue systems change.

Why this matters: Most coverage of big philanthropy focuses on dollar amounts. Arnold's framing makes clear that scale only matters if you're engineering leverage on government behavior, not just writing bigger checks to existing programs.

Background

Arnold estimates the private sector at ~60% of the economy, government at ~40%, and the philanthropy slice that could target social systems at around 1%, with most of even that going to brick-and-mortar projects rather than policy change.

Arnold frames the tax deduction for charitable giving as creating a public-interest obligation: because the government is subsidising the gift through foregone revenue, the donor implicitly owes alignment with social goods. This leads to the theory-of-change question: should the 1% supplement government services (give more money to the homeless shelter) or try to make government services unnecessary (address the root cause of homelessness)? Arnold strongly prefers the latter — not because charity is wrong, but because large foundations have a comparative advantage in systems work that individual givers and government agencies do not.

the philanthropic sector is about two percent now when you take out giving to museums religious organizations and to the arts in general and religious organizations you get down to about one percent of the economy is philanthropy for social services or social goods

Also said
“it can either supplement government services so by providing more money to the homeless shelter a service that the government already provides but you can supplement that with more resources and that's typically described as charity trying to solve today's problems and then there's the what some would describe as strategic philanthropy of trying to get at the core roots of issues to prevent those problems from developing tomorrow”— The canonical Arnold Ventures distinction between charity and strategic philanthropy.

Evidence quality crisis in social science: almost nothing survives rigorous evaluation

~1 h 20 min

When Arnold first tried to identify the highest-ROI social programs to fund, he found the evidence base for almost every program collapsed on deeper inspection. Organisations claiming success cherry-pick studies; replication and randomised evaluation typically reduce reported effect sizes dramatically or eliminate them entirely. The lesson: programs that clearly work are already funded by government; new philanthropic money chases unvalidated ideas.

Why this matters: This is a direct parallel to the nutrition science replication crisis Attia covers elsewhere. Arnold encountered the same problem in social science: the headline meta-analysis says it works; the methodologically rigorous RCT says it does not.

Background

Arnold's foundation started with a canvassing approach — hire an expert, read everything, find the five best programs, write big checks. The preschool example: three papers say preschool is transformative; one rigorous Head Start evaluation says it has no effect.

Arnold describes the process: 'i pulled the research i had kind of metrics background and college smart enough to read the papers i could figure out what they were saying and so start with a topic like preschool you see three papers that say preschool is amazing it generates all these outcomes later in life and then you see one evaluation of the head start program that shows it does not really have an effect.' The deeper dig always revealed methodological battles. The generalisation that emerged: programs with robust evidence of success are, almost by definition, already embedded in government or mainstream service delivery. The frontier is structurally unfunded not because it lacks ideas but because evaluation is expensive and the political economy discourages honest self-assessment.

it got very frustrating because the more we would study the less we knew about what worked one of the learnings was very few programs worked the things that work are generally already part of the fabric of society

The US pays 50% of global pharmaceutical revenues on 3% of population

~2 h 10 min

Americans represent 3% of the world's population and pay approximately 50% of global pharmaceutical revenues — effectively subsidising drug R&D for the rest of the world while the NIH simultaneously subsidises the basic science on which those drugs are built. The US taxpayer thus funds both ends of the development pipeline but receives the highest prices, not a discount.

Why this matters: This is the structural incoherence at the centre of US drug pricing: the country that funds the basic science and takes the majority of market risk pays 2-3x what other wealthy nations pay for the same drugs.

Background

Arnold Ventures entered pharmaceutical pricing eight years before the episode, when no major philanthropic actor was focused on it. The political window was closed but cracking.

Arnold: 'right we are three percent of the world population united states three percent of the world population we pay 50 percent of the pharmaceutical revenues of the world so there is no doubt that the prices that we are paying is helping in creating incentive for more medicines that others then get to benefit from but one of the talking points i have in this is the nih spends so much money on the basic science that is required to get these drugs started and in return the pharmaceutical companies charge us 2x 3x the prices of other countries we should be getting a discount because the united states taxpayer is funding some of the basic science.' The argument is that pharma has managed to create an island of price-setting outside the normal trade-off structure of government budgeting, unlike every other claimant on public money.

we're three percent of the world's population united states three percent of the world's population we pay 50 percent of the pharmaceutical revenues of the world

Also said
“the nih spends so much money on the basic science that's required to get these drugs started and in return the pharmaceutical companies charge us 2x 3x the prices of other countries we should be getting a discount because the united states taxpayer is funding some of the basic science”— The double-subsidy argument: US taxpayers fund basic science AND pay the highest prices.

Plea bargain coercion: 95% of criminal cases never reach trial

~1 h 45 min

The US criminal justice system cannot process more than about 5% of cases through trial. The other 95% are plea bargained, often under conditions that coerce innocent people into guilty pleas through pure expected-value math: 20-year sentence risk vs 6-months-already-served certainty.

Why this matters: A trading-trained mind applying expected value to criminal justice: the individual rational calculation creates a system where pleading guilty to crimes you did not commit is often the correct EV decision, polluting the entire justice dataset with false convictions.

Arnold: 'i did not commit this crime but there is a chance i get found guilty i get a 20-year sentence or i can serve i can plead down to a lesser charge and get six months of which i have already been here for three months so three more months and i am out.' The downstream effects are not priced into that in-the-moment decision: a felony conviction destroys employment prospects, family stability, voting rights, and public housing access — all for a crime the person may not have committed. The structural fix requires massive resource investment in courts and public defenders, which competes with every other state budget priority and never wins.

it ends up being less than five percent of cases actually go in front of a judge most of them just get pled out

Also said
“i didn't commit this crime but there's a chance i get found guilty i get a 20-year sentence or i can serve i can plead down to a lesser charge and get six months of which i've already been here for three months so three more months and i'm out”— The precise EV calculation that drives false guilty pleas — a trading framework applied to criminal justice.

Spend-down philanthropy: giving away the entire fortune during your lifetime

~14 min

Arnold and his wife Laura are actively spending down their entire fortune — not leaving it to a perpetual endowment. At $400M/year against a ~$2B foundation asset base, they are on track to exhaust the foundation during their lifetimes. The argument: urgent problems exist now, the founder's judgment and relationships are most valuable while they are present, and perpetual foundations tend to ossify around founder intent rather than current evidence.

Why this matters: Counter to the Rockefeller/Gates Foundation model of perpetual endowment. Spend-down forces prioritisation and urgency — you cannot defer hard choices to future trustees.

Background

Arnold is in his mid-40s during this episode and has been at full-time philanthropy since around 2012. Laura Arnold has been full-time since 2008.

The operational implication of spend-down is that Arnold Ventures must continuously identify high-impact, high-leverage deployment opportunities — they cannot hold back capital waiting for the perfect moment. The DAF (donor-advised fund) is a parallel vehicle for additional giving. Arnold's model explicitly rejects the 'let the money compound' logic of endowment-building: he views compounding time as compounding deferred impact, not wealth.

one of our philanthropic intent is to give away the vast majority of our money during our lifetimes

Recommendations

Products, supplements, and tools mentioned in the episode

3 items

Liar's Poker by Michael Lewis

Book

Arnold describes reading Liar's Poker alongside Barbarians at the Gate in college as his introduction to the idea that trading was the biggest game around — the books that pulled him toward finance.

Arnold: 'i remember reading liars poker and i think barbarians at the gate both classic books about wall street and although growing up in dallas with my mom as an accountant my dad as a corporate lawyer i did not have a sense as to what wall street was except through these books.' This is an under-cited detail of how intelligent young people get drawn to financial careers — through the narrative literature of the industry, not its actual economics.

i remember reading liars poker and i think barbarians at the gate both classic books about wall street and it seemed like that was the biggest game around i got drawn to that game

Find Liar's

The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind

Book

Arnold describes being completely fixated on this book when it came out, as someone who was inside Enron's trading floor when the company was collapsing — it gave him the full picture of what was happening in other divisions while he was heads-down trading.

Arnold's perspective is unusual: he was the most profitable person at Enron during its final years and yet had almost no visibility into the fraud occurring in adjacent divisions. His account of the collapse emphasises how isolated the trading floor was from corporate decision-making — a structural feature that was both the source of his success and the source of his ignorance.

i remember reading the book smartest guys in the room in 2006 or whenever it came out and being like completely fixated on this thing

Find The

Further Pledge: giving everything above a living wage to charity

Practice

Arnold describes the Further Pledge as a commitment to give everything above a modest living salary (approximately $30,000-$50,000) to charity — and points out that the sacrifice this requires of a person making $50,000 is proportionally far greater than his own giving at $400M/year.

Arnold uses this to make a point about the nature of generosity: giving from surplus is admirable but not heroic; giving from your marginal income — the income that actually changes your quality of life — is the higher form. He frames the giving impulse as universally human: once a family needs are secure, people naturally extend their circle of concern outward.

vs alternatives

Versus the Giving Pledge (Buffett-Gates, focused on billionaires pledging majority of net worth at death), the Further Pledge is more radical in its living-standard implications and more accessible as a model for non-billionaires.

there's a small movement called further pledge where you pledged to give everything above a relatively small salary like 30 000 maybe up to 50 000 to charity and knowing that dollar you're giving is creating more total good than you spending it

Find Further
Disclosed sponsorships1speaker disclosed

Arnold Ventures (arnoldventures.org)

Service Sponsored · disclosed

For listeners interested in the operational model of systems-change philanthropy, Arnold Ventures publishes its work, evidence frameworks, and grantee list publicly. The foundation focuses on criminal justice reform, k-12 education, pharmaceutical pricing, public finance, and election administration.

DisclosureJohn Arnold co-chairs Arnold Ventures with his wife Laura — this is their own foundation.

The foundation runs as an LLC, which allows the same staff expert to do both research and legislative advocacy without the organisational Chinese wall that previously hampered them. This structural choice reflects Arnold's view that policy change requires the integration of evidence generation and political action — siloing the two reduces effectiveness.

we combined the two entities into an llc so that the same employee who was the expert in fines and fees the options on how to change fines and fees to make them more equitable and just could also go sit there and talk to a legislator about why the problem existed and what the optimal solutions were

Find Arnold

Notable quotes

Lines worth pulling out — contrarian, specific, or perfectly phrased

5 items
we're three percent of the world's population united states three percent of the world's population we pay 50 percent of the pharmaceutical revenues of the world
The single most startling quantitative fact in the episode — the scale of the US pharmaceutical subsidy to the rest of the world, stated cleanly.
it ends up being less than five percent of cases actually go in front of a judge most of them just get pled out
Shatters the assumption that the US criminal justice system is a system of trials — it is overwhelmingly a system of plea bargains, many coerced.
you have to be arrogant but you can be too arrogant and that's been the destroyer of many trading careers is if you stick with it i am right the market is wrong then you're gonna blow up and so it's how do you have the right level where it's like i'm confident in my view on this but i know might be wrong
The cleanest articulation of the confidence-calibration problem that applies equally to trading, philanthropy, and science.
the more we would study the less we knew about what worked one of the learnings was very few programs worked the things that work are generally already part of the fabric of society
The honest conclusion from years of deep due diligence on social science evidence — most proven programs do not survive rigorous evaluation.
i always think about i want to help the world i want to solve problems but if the answer is just shovel more money at it that's not a sustainable answer in my mind so everything becomes how do we improve the system without spending more money or how do we improve the allocation of resources today
Arnold's foundational constraint: because US fiscal trajectories are unsustainable, every philanthropic and policy intervention must improve system efficiency, not just add spending.

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Topics covered

strategic-philanthropysystems-changeevidence-based-policycriminal-justice-reformpharmaceutical-pricingplea-bargain-coercionbipartisan-policynatural-gas-tradingexpected-value-decision-makingcalibrated-confidencek-12-education-reformspend-down-philanthropyorphaned-areas-strategysocial-science-replication-crisisprevention-vs-rehabilitationpublic-financeemotional-detachmentdomain-focus
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